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INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS STRATEGIES 
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
 
Abstract 
The concept of ‘distance’ has been used by international business scholars to explain variations 
in international business strategies and operations across countries. The more distant a host 
country is from the organizational centre of a multinational enterprise (MNE), the more it has to 
manage cultural, regulatory and cognitive differences, and to develop appropriate entry 
strategies, organizational forms, and internal procedures to accommodate these differences. 
  Scholarly research has focused on the concept of psychic distance, which has been 
narrowed down in empirical work to indices based on Hofstede’s work on culture. However, 
these measures capture only very partially the dimensions of distance of concern to international 
business. In this paper, we show how the broader theoretical concept of institutional distance, 
which incorporates normative, regulatory and cognitive aspects, affects entry strategies. 
Specifically, our theoretical arguments suggest that the impact of distance varies with different 
aspects of the concept of institutional distance, and that this impact interacts with both the 
investor’s experience and with the relative importance of the pertinent operation for the 
investing MNE. Using a unique dataset of foreign direct investment in emerging economies that 
incorporates multi-host as well as multi-home countries, we find empirical support for our 
propositions, and provide an explanation for apparently inconsistent results in the previous 
literature.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of ‘distance’ has been of central interest to international business scholars’ attempts 
to explain variations in international business strategies and operations across countries. The 
more distant a host country is from the organizational centre of a multinational enterprise 
(MNE), the more it has to bridge differences in culture, in laws and regulation, and in 
organizational practices and routines. The MNE has to adapt its entry strategies, organizational 
forms, and internal procedures to manage these differences (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977; Kogut 
and Singh, 1988; Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
Institutional distance is of particular concern for Western MNEs operating in emerging   2
economies, where idiosyncratic regulatory environments may inhibit international business 
(Henisz, 2003). For instance, legal codes governing market transactions may be less extensive, 
and law enforcement may be less efficient, for instance with respect to intellectual property 
rights (IPR). The challenges of adaptation may be less serious for MNE from developing 
countries, e.g. Asia. Organizations must develop managerial and commercial practices and 
routines for filtering and processing information that suit the variations in institutions. 
Institutional differences between source and host countries affect investors’ internal transfer of 
knowledge and practices, and their external quest for legitimacy in the local context, and 
therefore have to be accommodated when designing business strategies (Xu and Shankar, 2003; 
Luo, 2001; Meyer, 2001). The more the host economy differs from the context with which the 
MNE is familiar, the more difficult the adaptation. However, with a few notable exceptions (Xu 
and Shenkar, 2002; Xu, Pan and Beamish, 2004), researchers have not yet come to grips with 
these problems. 
The international business literature has developed the concept of “psychic distance” to 
address some of these issues (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977); and this is usually narrowed down in 
empirical studies by employing an index first developed by Kogut and Singh (1988) on the basis 
of Hofstede’s (1980) work on national culture. For Hofstede, culture mainly encompasses the 
norms and beliefs held by individuals in a country. Several studies use the Kogut-Singh index to 
show that the distance between FDI’s host and home countries influences strategies pursued by 
MNE, for example entry mode choice (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; 
Agarwal, 1994). However, psychic distance is a broad concept, and aspects other than cultural 
norms influence business strategies (Ghemawat, 2001; Shenkar, 2001). When entering a foreign 
market, MNEs interact with a complex local context that also includes regulatory and cognitive 
institutions (Scott, 1995/2001). MNEs have to adjust to the multifaceted institutional 
environment of each country where they operate (Meyer, 2001; Henisz, 2003; Peng, 2003), and 
this adjustment is more challenging, the more the foreign environment differs from the MNE’s 
home territory.  
In this paper, we build on recent theoretical work by Scott (1995/2001) and Kostova 
(1998) to extend the concept of distance by incorporating normative, regulatory and cognitive 
elements (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Xu and Shankar, 2003). Theoretical considerations suggest 
that strategic decisions in international business may be affected in very different ways by the   3
different dimension of distance. We investigate these effects for a key decision in international 
business, investors’ likelihood of entering by greenfield investment; and we investigate the 
moderating effects of investor and project characteristics on the distance to mode relationship. 
We therefore add to the literature on entry mode choice (e.g. Agarwal, 1994; Park and Ungson, 
1997; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001) by studying a broader concept of distance, and their 
interactions with other variables. 
We propose that three indices should be used jointly to capture the relevant aspects of 
distance to international business; the Kogut-Singh index to capture the normative dimension 
being complemented with indices of regulatory and cognitive distance based on widely available 
country-level data. These measures are designed to be employable for a large range of research 
issues in international business. We empirically test our propositions with these measures, 
employing a multi-host multi-home country dataset suitable for testing the effects of distance. 
We thus improve over prior studies that typically employ single-host multi-home, or multi-home 
single-host country datasets. We generate the dataset with a questionnaire survey of foreign 
investors in India, Vietnam, Egypt and South Africa, four countries at different stages of 
economic development and with substantial differences in their normative, regulatory and 
cognitive environments. The investors in the sample originate from 48 home countries, including 
both industrialized economies and emerging economies. The special appeal of this dataset is the 
high variation of institutional contexts between both source and recipient countries, so the results 
are unlikely to be driven by the idiosyncrasies of a particular source or host country. 
In support of our theoretical arguments, we find clear variations in the way that different 
aspects of distance impact on strategic decisions. Thus, while regulatory distance increases the 
propensity for greenfield investment, cognitive distance has diametrically the opposite effect. 
Though normative distance is found not to have a significant direct effect, it interacts with both 
the investor’s international experience and with the relative importance of the pertinent operation 
for the investing MNE. Our findings may help to explain ambiguities in previous results that rely 
on a single proxy for psychic distance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss our 
theoretical constructs: institutional distance, and the entry modes. Then, we develop hypotheses 
concerning the impact of institutional distance on MNE’s choice of entry mode, before 
developing our new measures of institutional distance between countries. We next introduce the   4
methods of empirical analysis, before presenting and interpreting the empirical results. 
Conclusions for international business are drawn in the final section.  
 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
Institutional Distance in International Business  
Institutional theory has emerged as a leading theoretical foundation for research on 
enterprise strategies in emerging economies, along with transaction-cost and resource based 
views (Hoskisson et al., 2000). An important characteristic of emerging economies is that 
market-supporting institutions are less developed, and thus constrain firms’ strategic choices 
(Khanna and Palepu 2000; Peng, 2003, Ramamurti, 2004). Institutional theory provides a 
framework to analyze the determinants of business strategies in such economies (Peng 2003, 
Wright et al., 2005).  
Scott’s (1995/2001) three ‘pillars of the institutional framework’ provide a broad basis to 
differentiate aspects of countries’ institutional profile (Kostova, 1998; Busenitz, 2000) and of 
institutional distance (Kostova and Roth, 2002). The regulatory pillar of the institutional 
framework lays out the ground rules for doing business, reflecting the laws and regulations of a 
region or country and the extent to which these rules are effectively monitored and enforced. The 
cognitive pillar rests on the cognitive structures embedded in a society; that is, the widely shared 
social knowledge and cognitive categories (e.g. schemata and stereotypes) (Markus and Zajonc, 
1985). The normative pillar consists of beliefs, values, and norms that define expected behavior 
in a society. These pillars of the institutional framework are based on different types of 
motivation, respectively coercive, mimetic, and normative, and differ in their degree of 
formalization and tacitness (Scott, 1995/2001). In consequence, they exert dissimilar pressures 
and expectations on organizations (Pfeffer, 1982; Oliver, 1991; D’Aunno, Sutton, and Price, 
1991).  
In international business, the regulatory, cognitive, and normative dimensions all 
influence strategies and operations of affiliates in foreign countries. They moderate the 
acceptance of MNE’s norms and practices within the socially constructed system of rules, 
norms, and cognitive frames in different host environments (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999); and 
they facilitate or impede the transfer of strategic organizational practices from a parent company   5
to an affiliate (Kostova and Roth, 2002). The “liability of foreignness” (Zaheer 1995) lowers the 
profitability of foreign investors compared to their local competitors. To compensate for this, 
MNEs must transfer their organizational practices that constitute an important source of 
competitive advantage to their affiliates (Kogut, 1991; Grant, 1996). Local firms are adapted to 
local institutions, and their organizational structures and cultures have to be consistent with the 
isomorphic pressures in their local environment. Foreign affiliates have to accommodate these 
same pressures and earn legitimacy in order to ensure their survival and success in the new 
context (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The 
need to gain legitimacy with both the local environment and with the worldwide organization of 
the MNE exposes subsidiaries of multinational firms to ‘institutional dualism’ (Kostova and 
Roth 2002). MNE’s ease of adjustment depends on their familiarity with a country’s institutional 
profile (Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Xu, Pan and Beamish, 2004). 
*** Figure 1 approximately here *** 
The obstacles faced by MNEs operating abroad are at least of two types (Figure 1). 
Firstly, the interaction of the foreign parent and the local affiliate is inhibited by their 
embeddedness in different national contexts. Institutional distance may thus inhibit internal 
coordination and integration, notably the transfer of knowledge and practices. Secondly, the 
MNE affiliate is subject to institutional pressures from both its parent and from the local 
environment (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Its ways of doing business may thus differ from that of 
local organizations, which may inhibit the interaction between the foreign affiliate and local 
organizations and individuals. Thus, MNE affiliates may be constrained in developing the 
external relations that could allow them to gain legitimacy in the local environment.  
The more different the MNEs origins are from the context that they enter, the greater will 
become obstacles to attaining local legitimacy and to practice transfer. International business 
research has analyzed the adaptation of business to foreign institutions with reference to 
“psychic distance”. This concept captures “the sum of factors preventing the flow of information 
from and to the market” and, among other aspects, encompasses “differences in language, 
education, business practices, culture and industrial development” (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977, 
p. 24). Following Kogut and Singh (1988), previous work has primarily been based on 
Hofstede’s (1980) work on national culture, which measures culture on four scales: masculinity-
femininity, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power-distance. As argued   6
above, organizations act in an even more complex environment formed by regulatory, cognitive 
and normative pillars of the institutional framework (Scott 1995/2001). The three dimensions – 
regulatory, normative and cognitive – may have varying effects on investor strategies, and 
interact in different way with the specific characteristics of the MNE concerned.
1 We thus use 
this broader concept of institutional distance to investigate the relationship between distance and 
business strategies. 
Institutional distance is a useful tool in analyzing all international business relationships, 
but is of particular relevance with respect to emerging economies because of the diversity of 
inward investors. Emerging economies, typically receive most FDI from developed countries, 
and in Table 1 we illustrate this for our sample of emerging and developed markets. Indeed, 
emerging and mature economies receive most of their FDI inflow from the same developed 
countries (see also UNIDO 2003). This implies that emerging markets typically experience a 
large variation in the distance between their own environments and those of their main foreign 
investors, which we confirm for our sample of countries below. 
*** Table 1 approximately here *** 
 
Entry Mode Choice 
The choice of entry mode represents one of the most important strategic decisions by MNEs 
operating in emerging economies, and has been analyzed extensively in the international 
business literature using in particular transactions cost or resource based theories.  For instance, 
the level of ownership (e.g. Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hill, Hwang and Kim, 1990, Meyer 
2001) and the choice between greenfield investment and cooperative modes (Hennart and Park, 
1993; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Anand and Delios, 2002) 
have been investigated.  Transactions cost research focuses on the costs of alternative 
organizational arrangements, and suggest that firms prefer modes of operation that internalize 
sensitive interfaces (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993). The resource based 
                                                 
1 The obstacles to business vary across different elements of the institutional framework. Kostova and Roth (2002) 
show that internalization of organizational practices by MNE affiliates is facilitated by favorable cognitive and 
normative institutions factors. Yet, in a favorable regulatory environment, a parent’s request to adopt a specific 
practice may be perceived as an external coercion and impede its internalization. With respect to affiliates’ quest to 
establish and maintain legitimacy, the normative and cognitive dimensions of institutions pose a greater challenge 
because regulatory institutions are more formalized and thus easier understood by newcomers (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999).  
   7
view focuses on how alternative modes facilitate or inhibit the processes of organizational 
learning (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) and of developing and exploiting resources (Anand 
and Delios, 2002). Both have been complemented with institutional variables (Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2000; Meyer, 2001, Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), but not as yet with a theoretically 
grounded set of variables capturing the complexity of institutional distance.  
  In emerging economies, the main decision faced by foreign investors is probably 
between a greenfield investment on one side, and partnering with local firms by acquisitions and 
joint venture (JV) on the other. This is because MNE’s entering a developing market must first 
choose between accessing local context-specific resources and capabilities in embedded form, or 
entering alone. Due to high distances in institutions, entrants often need local resources such as 
institutional or market knowledge that is embedded in existing organizations (Meyer and Estrin, 
2001; Anand and Delios 2002) and these can be accessed either by forming a joint venture or by 
taking over a local firm.  
 
Institutional distance and the entry mode choice 
Alternative modes of entry provide foreign investors with different means to manage the dual 
challenges of institutional distance; gaining legitimacy and transferring practices. Greenfield 
investors establish a new organization by recruiting and training staff individually, and creating 
an organizational structure that matches the MNE’s global structures (Brooke and Remmers, 
1970; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). Investors can therefore create an organizational culture that is 
similar to the parent, which reduces the frictions between parent and subsidiaries, and facilitates 
the transfer of practices. Consequently MNEs are more likely to choose a greenfield investment 
in situations where transmitting their own practices to their affiliates is of greater concern than 
earning and maintaining legitimacy. 
 However, greenfield projects have, at least initially, only very limited legitimacy in the 
local environment, while cooperation with a local partner in form of a JV or an acquisition 
enables the foreign investor to benefit from the partner’s local status. Cooperative entry thus 
allows the MNE to appear less foreign than entry via greenfield projects (Kostova and Zaheer, 
1999), even though the process of internal accommodation may not always be smooth (Xu and 
Shenkar, 2002). Therefore the choice of a JV or a local acquisition is more appropriate in MNE’s 
for which the attainment of local legitimacy is of greater concern than transferring practices to   8
affiliates. However, such cooperation implies that the local organization is more strongly 
influenced by local practices, which implies that the interactions with other units of the foreign 
parent MNE may be less smooth. Thus greenfield projects facilitate transfer of organizational 
practices, while JVs and acquisitions are more useful to build local legitimacy.  
This differential exposure to local institutions makes it natural to apply institutional 
theory to analyze the link between differences in business environments and MNEs’ entry modes 
(Davis, Desai and Francis, 2000; Lu 2002, Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Harzing, 2003). We thus 
extend the prior entry mode literature by using various aspects of institutional distance to 
separate the effects of regulatory, normative and cognitive distance. In the next section, we 
develop specific hypotheses about how different aspects of institutional distance might influence 
entry mode choice. In addition to direct effects, we consider the possible interaction with the 
investors’ experience and the relative exposure to the local context. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES  
Direct Effects of Distance on Entry Mode 
Different tensions between local and corporate institutional pressures are created in the three 
institutional pillars by distance. Kostova (1999) argues that high normative, regulatory and 
cognitive institutional distance between the host and home country impedes the transfer of 
strategic organizational practices from a parent company to a recipient. If a practice is 
inconsistent with existing local regulations, norms or cognitive structures, then employees may 
be reluctant to implement it, or might face problems in understanding and learning it. Thus, 
bonus-based payment schemes are an example of a practice that may be difficult to transfer 
(Pennings, 1993). Regulatory barriers may prohibit certain elements of the scheme in some 
countries, normative barriers may moderate the appreciation of standing out among a peer group, 
and cognitive differences may influence the perceived causality between individual effort and 
remuneration.   
Normative and cognitive distance between an acquired business unit and the parent 
organization especially inhibits its ability to attain legitimacy in the local context (Kostova and 
Zaheer, 1999). In contrast, regulatory aspects are more formalized and thus are easier understood 
by MNEs, and more accepted as a cause for local adaptation. Therefore, a high normative and 
cognitive distance impedes the adoption of an MNE’s practice and restrains the affiliate’s   9
capacity to establish legitimacy, while a high regulatory distance is likely to have a negative 
effect primarily on the adoption of an MNE’s practices.  
By establishing a greenfield investment, an MNE can partially alleviate these difficulties 
in adopting desired practices caused by regulatory distance because it can create a new 
organization after its own image, e.g. by recruiting suitable individuals and by training them in 
the parent firm’s organizational practices. Moreover, as we have seen, regulatory distance does 
not create equally important obstacles to gaining local legitimacy. As regulatory rules are mostly 
codified, foreigners may find it relatively easy to adapt to local regulatory pressures without a 
local partner, even if regulatory distance is high. Thus, we hypothesize that overcoming 
obstacles to practice adoption outweighs the need to obtain local legitimacy as regulatory 
distance increases. Hence, the balance of advantage suggests that an increase in regulatory 
distance will have a positive impact on MNEs’ propensity to establish a greenfield project:  
 
Hypothesis 1a: MNE’s are more likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint 
venture when the regulatory distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
On the other hand, both normative and cognitive distance have a negative impact on the 
adoption of practices and the affiliates’ ability to earn legitimacy. However, the impact on entry 
mode choice is complex. Obstacles to practice adaptation in existing local organizations would 
encourage greenfield investment in the same way as for regulatory distance.  However, obstacles 
to gaining legitimacy would encourage entry by joint venture or acquisition. Adaptation to local 
institutional pressures is more challenging if facing normative and cognitive differences than 
with regulatory differences. While regulatory institutions are relatively transparent, norms and 
cognition require intensive cross-cultural communication because they are hard to comprehend, 
and knowledge about other cultures is often tacit (Boyacigiller, Goodman and Phillips, 2004). 
Such communication is easier if an MNE affiliate obtains the knowledge of a local organization 
through a joint venture or an acquired firm. Greenfield investors have less cultural knowledge to 
draw on when communicating with local peers, which inhibits efforts to gain legitimacy. The 
impact of normative and cognitive on entry mode choice therefore depends on the relative 
importance of practice mode adoption and attaining local legitimacy.   
We would argue that MNE’s can more easily adopt behaviors and practices within   10
businesses where they have some understanding of the underlying technologies and markets than 
they can with respect to, for example, supply chains, purchases of inputs, ability to market 
outputs and dealing with local rules and regulations which entail attaining local legitimacy.   
Thus, when normative and cognitive distance is high, interaction with the local environment will 
be particularly important, which increases the importance of creating links with local peers.  This 
leads us to hypothesize that, in these circumstances, the need to gain local legitimacy and to 
access local business networks will outweigh other considerations.  Hence normative and 
cognitive distance will encourage JV entry or acquisitions rather than greenfield entry.
2   
 
Hypothesis 1b: MNEs are less likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint 
venture when the normative distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
Hypothesis 1c: MNEs are less likely to choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint 
venture when the cognitive distance between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
Institutional distance and the size of the local operation  
The relative strength of isomorphic pressures on an affiliate from the local environment and 
from foreign parent depends on specific internal (Zaheer, 1995) and contextual variables 
(Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). Thus different types of FDI projects vary in their sensitivity to 
institutional distance. In particular, we expect the scale and scope of the local operation and of 
the MNE’s global resources to moderate the impact of institutional distance on entry mode 
decisions. We analyze two such characteristics: the relative size of the affiliate and the foreign 
parent’s international experience. 
Overseas affiliates vary in their relative importance for the investing MNE. When MNEs 
build greenfield operations that are large relative to their own size, internal resource constraints 
may inhibit the establishment of the new affiliate. For example, assuming that there is a 
maximum rate at which the firm can recruit and train managers, firms seeking to expand rapidly 
may be constrained by internal shortages of human capital (Penrose, 1959). Similarly, a large 
                                                 
2 This is supported for instance by Meyer and Lieb-Dóczy (2003) who show that, when acquired subsidiaries in 
Hungary and East Germany have some degree of managerial autonomy, they can generate innovative solutions 
adapted to the local context and new capabilities that can be used in the MNE’s worldwide operations. This suggests 
that, at least for these acquisitions, accommodating the legitimacy pressure has been more important than adopting 
corporate practices.   11
greenfield affiliate may be more difficult to finance because capital markets have difficulties in 
accessing and verifying information, which the firm may posses, on the merits of the project. In 
contrast, outside investors can more easily assess acquisitions based on the track record of the 
acquired organization (Chatterjee 1990). Therefore, the additional resources that MNE’s aiming 
to establish large affiliates, relative to their size, requires can be accessed more easily by 
acquiring a local firm or by establishing a JV. Several empirical studies find that larger affiliates 
are less likely in form of greenfield projects (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Kogut and Singh 1988; 
Hennart and Park 1993; Padmanabhan and Cho 1995; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000). This 
leads us to: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: MNE’s establishing a large affiliate (relative to their own size) are less likely to 
enter by greenfield investment than by acquisition or joint venture. 
 
A relatively large subsidiary commands more attention from top management than a 
smaller operation because it has a stronger impact on corporate performance. Moreover, the 
transfer of practices becomes relatively more important and more difficult because the parent has 
relatively fewer resources and experiences. Large acquisitions therefore take on more of the 
character of mergers, in that both organizations have to adjust to each other, rather than a small 
acquired unit having to adapt to the established practices of the new parent. Such a process 
requires more intensive interaction between individuals, and thus cross-cultural communication 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Similarly, when setting up a JV agreement the MNE exposes 
itself to problems regarding intercultural negotiations that are likely to result in a decreased 
performance of the affiliate (Brett and Okumura, 1998). Cross-cultural communication is more 
likely to fail, the higher the normative and cognitive distance between the organizations. This is 
because differences in scripts, schemas, norms or values impede information sharing between 
individuals from different cultures and might inhibit their ability to search for better alternatives. 
Hence, in a distant market, obstacles to establishing and managing a large acquisition or joint 
venture rise disproportionately and firms wishing to establish a large operation would be more 
likely to choose entry by greenfield then they would be in nearby locations. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: MNE’s establishing a large affiliate (relative to their own size) are less likely to   12
enter by greenfield investment, yet this effect is weaker in countries with high normative and 
cognitive distances. 
 
Institutional distance and experience in emerging economies 
We have argued that entry mode choice implies a trade-off between the challenges of 
transfer of practices and of gaining local legitimacy. Both challenges increase, the less familiar is 
a foreign investor with the local environment. However, familiarity can also be developed 
through commercial experience in the country (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977; Davis, Desai, and 
Francis, 2000). Through a process of acculturation (Berry, 1980), MNEs develop familiarity 
with local environment in which they operate. This is generally assumed to reduce the effects of 
distance (Shenkar, 2001). MNEs can draw their knowledge of foreign markets from a broad 
range of contexts in which they operate. Their internal processes thus reflect a variety of 
different institutional frameworks, which facilitates cross-cultural transfer of practices, and 
reduces associated costs. MNEs with experience in similar environments may even have 
developed practices specifically to serve such contexts. Moreover, having gone through the 
process of local adaptation and attaining legitimacy in similar emerging economies, they can be 
expected to build capabilities that facilitate this process (Henisz, 2003). 
Regional experience may be more important for MNEs’ in emerging economies than the 
more general concepts of international experience used in the analysis of international business 
strategies in developed countries (Delios and Henisz, 2003, Henisz, 2003, Uhlenbruck, 2004). In 
emerging economies, problems of law enforcement can be ubiquitous, bringing into question the 
ability of new entrants to enforce contracts. Moreover, compared with their counterparts from 
industrialized nations, local firms in developing countries may have a smaller resource 
endowment (Hitt et al. 2000), in particular fewer marketing capabilities (Fahy et al., 2000), and 
less experience in forming and managing strategic alliances (Lewin, Long and Carroll, 1999). 
Skills and practices developed through prior experience in developed countries are also often 
inappropriate or impossible to apply in an emerging markets context (Tallman, 1992). The MNE 
may instead develop specific business concepts and methods to serve the needs and abilities of 
customers in an emerging market, and subsequently transfer them to other similar emerging 
economies (Prahalad, 2004). 
Local experience in emerging markets is however less crucial when operating in similar   13
environments, such that we would expect a direct effect of experience on mode choice only 
when analyzing FDI between distant countries. Hence, experience diminishes the impact of 
distance predicted in hypotheses H1a to H1c, such that the interaction effects should have the 
opposite effect than the direct effects:  
 
Hypothesis 3a: MNE’s that have little experience in emerging economies are more likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the regulatory distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
Hypothesis 3b: MNE’s that have little experience in emerging economies are less likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the normative distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
Hypothesis 3c: MNE’s that have little experience in emerging economies are less likely to 
choose greenfield investment than acquisition or joint venture when the cognitive distance 
between the home and the host countries is large. 
 
INDICES OF INSTITUTIONAL DISTANCE  
Empirical studies on the impact of distance on entry mode choice have mostly employed 
the Kogut-Singh index
3 and generated inconclusive results (Shenkar, 2001; Brouthers and 
Brouthers, 2001). For example, Kogut and Singh (1988) find a negative correlation between 
control over the affiliates and cultural distance while Pan (1996) reports the opposite. This 
inconsistency is, in our view, due to the imprecision of the measures used. In this section, we 
refine institutional measures that are relevant for the entry mode choice, complementing the 
Kogut-Singh index with indicators of regulatory and cognitive distance.
  
The normative pillar of a country’s institutional profiles consists of values and norms. 
Values define what is preferred or desirable, while norms specify how things should be done and 
therefore delineate what a society perceives as accepted behavior. The issues are captured by 
Hofstede’s indices of culture, and thus by Kogut-Singh index. Three out of the four cultural 
dimensions defined by Hofstede (1980) capture aspects of expected social behavior: Power 
Distance describes the expected behavior toward higher and lower rank people, 
                                                 
3 An indication of the popularity of the measure is frequency of citations to Kogut and Singh (1988). According to 
the SSCI database, the paper was cited 260 times from 1988 to 2003, 28 times in 2003.   14
Individualism/Collectivism depicts peoples attitude toward the group, and 
Masculinity/Femininity captures the status of values traditionally associated with male and 
female role models. In addition, the normative dimension encompasses beliefs and assumptions 
about the human nature, which are reflected in an individual’s attitude and quest for truth. More 
precisely, on the religious or philosophical level, individuals from some societies believe in an 
ultimate truth and adhere to strict laws and rules that lead them to it. Unusual situations make 
them feel uncomfortable and so they rather avoid them. However, in other societies people are 
relativist, have as few rules as possible, and feel at much more ease in unstructured situations. 
These aspects are captured by the fourth dimension of Hofstede’s culture construct – Uncertainty 
Avoidance.
 4  
An extensive literature establishes the relevance of distance in Hofstede’s cultural 
construct for the entry mode decision (Kogut and Singh, 1988; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001 among many others). Therefore we use as a proxy for the 
normative distance an index based on Hofstede’s cultural construct that we compute in the 
following way: 
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where Ii,host (Ii,origin) is the ith dimension of the index for the host country (country of origin) and 
Vi is the variance of the ith dimension. 
The regulatory dimension of distance concerns laws and other rules that influence 
business strategies and operations. According to Scott (1995/2001), the regulatory pillar of 
institutions consists of rules and regulations and the extent to which these rules are monitored 
and enforced. Thus, Scott's definition incorporates all possible aspects of regulation. In order to 
implement this comprehensive notion empirically, we employ an index that covers as broad a 
range of regulatory aspects as possible, the ‘Regulatory Factor’ of the Economic Freedom Index 
published by The Heritage Foundation. This index includes six sub-indices (Beach and Miles 
2003):  
 
•  Licensing requirements to operate a business 
                                                 
4 In more recent work, Hofstede introduced a fifth dimension ‘Confucian dynamism’ to capture the specific features 
of Asian societies, but these data are not available for the same large set of countries; and scholars using Kogut-
Singh indices do not normally incorporate it.   15
•  Ease of obtaining a business license 
•  Corruption within the bureaucracy 
•  Labor regulations, such as established workweeks, paid vacations, and parental leave, as 
well as selected labor regulations 
•  Environmental, consumer safety, and worker health regulations 
•  Regulations that impose a burden on business  
 
We use data for the year 2000, and compute the regulatory distance as the absolute value 
of the difference between the regulatory measures of the home and host country (for detailed 
definitions and sources of the variables, see Appendix 1). 
The cognitive pillar comprises frames, routines and scripts used by individuals in one 
society to judge and to assign meaning to a phenomenon and to solve problems. The existing 
cognitive frames held by employees in organizations determine what information is retained and 
how it is processed, organized and interpreted. They also shape the preset routines developed by 
organizations to provide guidance and reduce the discretion of the individuals when attempting 
to solve problems. The future operation and performance of foreign affiliates are affected by the 
way that managers and other employees process new information and the relevance of developed 
and adopted routines. These aspects are difficult to measure, especially by readily available data. 
However, individuals with higher education are more likely to spot and adequately process 
essential information and are more receptive to innovation (Becker, 1970; Rogers and 
Shoemaker, 1971; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). In addition, in 
comparison with individuals who are mainly interested in their own community, individuals 
oriented towards a society beyond their own community are also more committed to attain 
professional goals and therefore more likely to adopt innovations in their workplace (Merton, 
1957). Therefore, more highly educated or more cosmopolitan employees are more inclined to 
contribute to valuable routines developed in the organization. Moreover, people that are more 
exposed to new information and technology have a broader scope to add to the sphere of 
organizational knowledge and routines. We thus measure cognitive distance by combining two 
items of educational achievements and two items of exposure to new technologies that also 
indicate the society’s level of cosmopolitanism. The education measures are the percentage of 
economically active population with tertiary education, and the average schooling years in the   16
total population. We measure technology exposure and cosmopolitanism by the number of 
computers and Internet hosts per 1000 persons. The data derive from a variety of sources. We 
consulted the ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics, OECD Statistics, and country Statistical Offices 
to collect information on the percentage of the economically active population that has attained 
tertiary education. The average schooling years in the total population comes from Barro and 
Lee’s (2000) dataset on educational attainment. For the number of computers and Internet hosts 
per 1000 persons we used the World Development Indicators. Whenever possible, we used data 
for the year 2000. Otherwise, we used data for the closest preceding year for which the data was 
available. Crombach’s alpha analysis showed a 0.60 inter-item correlation. Finally, to compute 
the cognitive distance we use the same formula as above. 
The measures are both based on readily available data for almost all developing and 
developed economies. In addition, with the exception of Hofstedes’s (1980) cultural dimension, 
these indices are reported each year, starting at least from 1995, making them suitable to be used 
with recent sets of data. In Table 2, we report the three measures of distance for the countries of 
Table 1, including the four emerging markets of our study. The three measures give a different 
ranking for the four emerging markets. Interestingly, South Africa has the lowest average for all 
three measures of distance but the highest is for Vietnam for regulatory distance and for Egypt 
with respect to both cognitive and normative distance. 
*** Table 2 approximately here *** 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Data 
Our study is based on an interesting new data set from a recent FDI survey in the four emerging 
economies (Estrin and Meyer, 2004). The base population for the survey study was all registered 
foreign direct investment projects established between 1990 and 2000, with a minimum 
employment of 10 persons, and minimum foreign equity stake of 10%. The time limit was 
designed to ensure that information concerning the establishment was part of the organization 
memory and therefore available at the time of the survey. The base population has been 
constructed on the basis of local databases. In India and Vietnam, comprehensive databases were 
obtained from the authorities licensing or registering FDI. In Egypt and South Africa, we used 
commercial databases that were complemented with the research institutes’ own databases.    17
The questionnaire was administered to foreign investment companies in the four 
countries between November 2001 and April 2002 by local research institutions. They sent the 
questionnaire to a stratified random sample drawn from the base population. In most cases, they 
followed up by sending specifically trained assistants to interview the CEO or an appropriate 
senior manager, though some questionnaires were received by mail. Response rates from 
between 10% of the population in Egypt to 31% in South Africa. The sample was stratified by 
two digit industrial sectors to ensure that the sectoral distribution of firms closely resembled the 
distribution for the population.  Within each sector, firms were chosen randomly.  
This study is based on the manufacturing subset of the sample, because different factors 
can influence entry mode for service sector firms (Brouthers and Brouthers 2003), and because 
some of the measures of distance, e.g., regulatory, are found to be of particular relevance to 
industrial firms. The sub-sample contained 245 foreign affiliates, but our researchers 
encountered some resistance in responses to commercially sensitive material. Hence, as is 
common in emerging markets, we lost some observations due to missing values and we obtained 
208 useable observations for the regression analysis. This is quite a large sample for research of 
this sort in emerging economies. The missing values affect in particular small parent firms for 
whom information on parent-specific data is less available.
5 This seems unlikely to bias the 
estimates, albeit we shall be careful to make inferences about small parent firms. 
The regional patterns show clear geographic proximity-effects in Egypt and Vietnam, 
and strong European presence in South Africa and India. In Egypt and Vietnam, investors from 
other emerging markets with low institutional distance play an important role, notably Arab 
investors in Egypt and Chinese investors (especially from Taiwan) in Vietnam. In contrast, 
neither South Africa nor India benefit from regional FDI, as both countries are geographically 
distant from major multinational business centers.  
 
Empirical model and dependent variable 
We perform the econometric analysis using a Logit model in which the dependent variable is 
mode of entry. This procedure estimates the probability that a foreign investor establishes a 
                                                 
5 T-tests on the main variables of interest (mode, experience, time of entry, R&D intensity, etc) comparing firms 
with and without missing values to test for sample selection biases do not reveal statistically significant differences. 
However, the tests suggest that relatively small parent firms that undertake resource-seeking FDI in Vietnam 
account for a significantly higher share of the observations with missing values.    18
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where Y is defined as 
Y = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 + … + βn Xn. (2) 
X1, X2, … , Xn are the independent variables. Mode of entry is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 if the foreign operation was set up as a greenfield investment and a value of 0 
otherwise. We classified a newly established operation as greenfield investment if it was fully 
owned by foreign parents and did not involve takeover of a local firm. The proportion of 
greenfield projects in the sample is 24% in India, 26% in South Africa, 38% in Egypt and 66% 
in Vietnam.  
 
Independent Variables 
The most important independent variables of this research, the measures of institutional distance, 
have been introduced above. The hypothesized interaction effects between institutional distance 
and relative size and experience are tested on the basis of the survey data. Relative size is based 
on a question concerning the turnover of the affiliate relative to the parent, using six point Likert 
scale from “0.0-0.1%” to “over 20%”. Experience is captured with a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the foreign investor had prior experience in the host economy or any other 
emerging economy. In line with the literature, we also introduce a number of control variables 
that we expect to influence mode choice, listed below.  The measurements of these variables and 
data sources are described in Appendix 1. 
Market seeking: Foreign investors seeking new markets need to set up local distribution 
networks, which require a continuous interaction with the domestic environment, and, especially 
in developing markets, good connections with local and central governments (Rawski, 1994). 
Local firms are likely to have a good understanding of the local environment, established 
relationships with local businesses and authorities, and an adequate distribution network. Thus, 
we expect entry for market seeking reasons to be negatively related to the propensity to establish 
greenfield investments.  
Source of main resources: An affiliate that receives most of its key resources from its 
foreign parent is less dependent on local inputs and distribution channels. Moreover, the main   19
resources for success may be organizationally embedded, in which case they are more easily 
transferable between companies with similar organizational structures. Consequently, when the 
MNE provides the most important resources itself, it is more likely that the affiliate will be 
established as a greenfield investment.  
R&D intensity: Capabilities based on recent R&D are easier transferred to greenfield 
projects, as MNE’s can create a compatible organizational culture and technological 
infrastructure, and recruit new employees to fit their organization (Hennart and Park, 1993; 
Meyer and Estrin 2001). Therefore we conjecture that the propensity to enter through greenfield 
investment increases with the level of R&D intensity of the parent. 
Related: When a foreign investor sets up a horizontal investment in the same or a related 
industry, it already possesses industry-specific capabilities and is less likely to seek such 
resources from a local partner. Therefore, affiliates producing the same or related products as the 
parent firm are more likely to be set up as a greenfield project (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart 
and Park, 1993). 
Diversified: Diversified foreign investors often rely on managerial control systems that 
accommodate diverse operations. In addition, they are more likely to have been created through 
a series of acquisitions and/or JVs. Therefore, we expect that more diversified firms to have 
more experience with this form of expansion, and thus have a higher propensity to acquire or to 
form a JV. 
Time trends and country dummies: All countries in our dataset have gone through 
liberalization and economic reforms during the period when the sample firms first entered. Yet 
these reforms progressed at different times and different paces. We control for these country 
specific effects by including both country dummies and separate time trends for each of the four 
countries.  
Appendix 2 presents the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables. Apart for the interaction terms, the correlations do not reach ranges for 
which multicollinearity would be a concern. 
 
Results 
Our main purpose is to assess the explanatory power of the indices of institutional distance. As 
reference, we estimate a base model that includes relative size,  experience and the control   20
variables. The analysis is then conducted in three stages. First, we test hypotheses 1a to 1c by 
adding the three dimensions of the institutional distance to the base model. We estimate three 
restricted models (Model 1 to 3, Table 3) with one institutional aspect each, and their joint effect 
(Model 4, Table 3). We proceed by constructing four further models by adding to Models 1 to 4 
the corresponding interaction terms (Model 5 to 8, Table 4). Finally, we use Wald tests for linear 
hypotheses to identify the variables and the interaction terms that provide the best fit for the 
entry mode regression and use the results to construct a more parsimonious model (Model 9, 
Table 4). 
 
*** Table 3 *** 
 
The base model shows that relative size, experience and all control variables have signs 
consistent with our predictions. These variables are highly relevant for MNEs’ entry mode 
choice decision, explaining around 28% of the variation (as approximated by the pseudo R
2). 
Thus, the base model is fundamentally sound and largely consistent with prior empirical studies 
on entry modes.  Among the control variables, foreign parent’s degree of diversification, market 
seeking, and the source of main resources are highly significant with the expected sign. On the 
other hand, an expansion into a related business is associated with a greenfield investment, but 
not significantly so. Prior experience in the emerging markets has a negative effect on MNEs’ 
propensity to establish greenfield subsidiaries. For the relative size affiliate/parent however, the 
effect is not significant. We discuss these last two results together with the interaction effects 
below.  
 
Step I 
Models 1 to 3 in Table 3 show the impact of each aspect of institutional distance on the 
entry mode choice. The regulatory distance is highly significant and its sign is as predicted in 
Hypothesis 1a. This confirms our hypothesis that regulatory distance inhibits the adoption of 
corporate practices by a local partner firm, while not substantially affecting the ability of an 
affiliate to earn legitimacy. To facilitate the transfer of practices, MNEs set up greenfield 
investments.  
We predicted an opposite effect with respect to normative and cognitive distance. We   21
find strong support for Hypothesis 1c, with increasing cognitive distance lowering the propensity 
for greenfield investment. This implies that with increasing cognitive distance, foreign affiliates 
become more concerned with legitimacy than with adopting practices from their parent. 
Apparently, training of the affiliate’s employees can overcome the negative impact of cognitive 
distance on the transfer of MNEs’ practices, yet it does not enhance its legitimacy with different 
cognitive institutions. On the other hand, Hypothesis 1b  is not supported;  the impact of 
normative distance is not significantly different from zero. Comparing the individual models 
with the base model, both models 1 and 3 increase the explanatory power significantly – the chi-
square statistic increases respectively 6.88 and 9.81 for one degree of freedom. However, for 
model 2 the increase is very small and statistically not significant. 
When all three dimensions of institutional distance are included in the equation 
simultaneously in model 4, the chi-square statistic increases by more then 10 (and 2 degrees of 
freedom) compared to any of the previous models, which is highly significant. One might 
wonder whether the variation in entry mode choice can be fully captured by only one or two of 
institutional distance measures. Tests on the individual coefficients show that all three measures 
of institutional distance should be retain in the analysis; Wald tests that two (all possible 
combinations) or three institutional distances simultaneously have null coefficients are all 
rejected at 5% significance level. The increase in the chi-square and pseudo R
2 statistics in 
Model 4 also suggests that all three institutional distance measures should be retained in the 
equation. Thus, we conclude that regulatory, normative and cognitive distances between the 
home and the host countries are all essential to explain foreign investors’ entry mode choice, and 
should be used simultaneously.  
 
*** Table 4 *** 
 
Step II 
In Table 4, we report regressions that combine the direct effects of distance on entry mode with 
the hypothesized interaction effects.
6 Since our preferred model includes the three distance 
                                                 
6 Since we are primarily interested to know the impact of institutional distances on the entry mode strategies for 
MNEs with no prior experience in emerging markets and vice-versa, the impact of experience on these strategies 
when when countries have similar institutions, we did not center the interaction terms. Moreover, centering does not   22
variables, we would like to use this to explore the impact of particular interaction effects. 
Unfortunately, though this equation (Model 8) is highly significant, many of the individual 
coefficients are not which may be caused by multicollinearity between interaction terms and the 
corresponding direct effects, on one side, and the multicollinearity among interaction terms on 
the other. Therefore, we assess the impact of interaction terms on the entry mode choice based 
on models with only one aspect of institutional distance and its interaction terms (Models 5 to 7). 
As before, we start by analyzing the aspects of distance and their interaction effects individually 
in Models 5 to 7. Comparing Models 5 to 7 with their counterparts, Models 1 to 3, the chi-square 
is higher by respectively 5.38, 9.42 and 0.57, of which the first two are significant. Thus, we 
confirm the statistical relevance of interaction effects for regulatory and normative, but not for 
cognitive distance. 
  The results from Models 5 to 7 moreover show that the coefficient on the interaction 
effect between experience and distance are in all cases opposite to the direct effect, as predicted 
in hypotheses 3a to 3c. For regulatory and normative distance, the direct effect is positive and 
the interaction effect is negative, while the reverse holds for cognitive distance.  
This result suggests that the significant effect of prior commercial experience in 
emerging economies on foreign investors’ propensity to establish greenfield operations only 
applies for investors entering distant countries.
7 When controlling for the interaction with 
distance, the direct effect of experience remains small and insignificant in models 5 and 6. Thus, 
when distance is low, say for British investors in South Africa or Taiwanese in Vietnam, 
experience does not influence entry mode choice. In model 7, the direct effect of experience 
remains significant, which may indicate that the cognitive distance measure alone captures only 
part of the relevant institutional distance.  
For cognitive distance, we observe the same effect, but it remains insignificant in Model 
7. The direct effects on cognitive distance and experience are larger then in Model 3, but subject 
                                                                                                                                                             
reduce multicollinearity in our sample because of the characteristics of our data: most of the parent firms had had 
some experience in emerging markets when establishing the affiliates and experience is a dummy variable. 
7 The negative direct effect of experience may be explained by the fact that MNE’s with prior experience in 
emerging markets may have developed routines that are adapted to the particular context, which helps them to 
overcome the restructuring challenges facing acquisitions and the coordination problems with local partners (Hitt et 
al. 2000). MNE’s without such experience would find it more costly and time-consuming to find a partner, and to 
build a relationship – let alone engage in post-acquisition restructuring. Meanwhile, they are more likely to identify 
local partners with converging objectives. For these reasons, in Central and East European countries, local firms 
acquired by MNEs with prior experience in the region exhibit higher growth rates (Uhlenbruck, 2004).    23
to higher variance (lower Wald statistics), suggesting multicollinearity. The lack of significance 
of the interaction effect may be because investors can overcome differences in cognitive 
institutions by providing training to affiliate employees. This would lower the constraints on the 
adoption of parent’s practice.  
The size of an FDI project relative to its parent MNE’s size is found in Table 3 to be 
negatively associated with the propensity for greenfield investment but the coefficients are 
insignificant when no interaction effects are considered. However distance might still moderate 
the impact of relative size on the entry mode choice. This is confirmed for normative distance, 
but not for regulatory or cognitive distance (Table 4). In Model 7, the joint impact of relative 
size and institutional distance is highly significant, and the direct effect of relative size also 
becomes significant. It would seem that the effect of relative size varies under different 
conditions, which leads to insignificant coefficients when not controlling for the interaction with 
distance. Thus, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are supported with respect to normative distance.  
To further illuminate the impact of relative size, we analyze the marginal effects. First we 
insert in equation (2) the actual values of coefficients (Model 7, Table 4) and then take the first 
derivative of equation (1) with respect to relative size, holding all other explanatory variables 
constant: 
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Thus, ceteris paribus, the overall impact of the relative size on the propensity to establish a 
greenfield investment is negative when the normative distance between FDI’s home and host 
country is small but turns positive for high values of this distance (Normative_d > 2.825).
8 To 
understand these relations, for “low” and “high” values of relative size and normative distance, 
we compute the probability that an investment is set up as greenfield (equation (1)) keeping all 
other effects constant at their mean value. We define as “low” and “high” values that are, 
respectively, one standard deviation above and below the mean (Aiken and West, 1991; 
Erramilli and Rao, 1993). The resulting graphs are presented in Figure 2 and illustrate the 
direction of change in probabilities as the relative size increases.
9 
                                                 
8 Note that this value is above the average of normative distance for all host countries as reported in Table 2.  
9 Note that the lines in this graph unite discrete points and do not represent the actual relationships between relative 
size and the probability to set up a greenfield investment; however, their slopes correctly show the direction of 
change (Erramilli and Rao, 1993).   24
 
*** Figure 2 *** 
 
When the normative distance between the host and the home country is small, the impact of 
relative size on the entry mode choice is as predicted in Hypothesis 2a, and a high relative size is 
associated with acquisition or JV. However, when the normative distance is large, institutional 
constraints become more important than the Penrose constraint, and so foreign investors are 
likely to choose greenfield investments, even when the relative size of the project with respect to 
the MNE is high.  
 
Step III 
The multicollinearity problems present in Model 8 led us to construct a more 
parsimonious regression by dropping insignificant variables on the basis of Wald tests. 
Interactive variables were dropped singly in inverse order to their significance until only 
significant terms remained. As a result of this procedure, all the interaction terms that were not 
significant in Models 5 to 7 need to be excluded, as is the interaction between the institutional 
distances and the parent firms’ experience. The final model, Model 9 in Table 4, includes just 
two interaction terms and explains an additional 3.1% of the variation in MNE’s’ entry strategies 
compared to Model 1.  
Models 8 and 9 allow us to reassess hypotheses 2a and 3a. An increase in the relative 
size of the foreign operation with respect to its parent reduces the probability that the operation 
is a greenfield project, which supports hypothesis 2a. In the models of Table 3, this effect was 
disguised by the missing interaction between the normative distance and relative size. In Model 
4, the negative effect of an increase in relative size is partly offset by the positive effect of the 
associated increase in the interaction term caused by the correlation between relative size and 
this interaction term. A reverse situation happens with the MNEs’ prior experience in emerging 
markets. Model 4 suggests that an increase in experience tilts MNE’s’ preference towards 
acquisitions or JV agreements. As we expected, once experience is interacted with institutional 
aspects in Models 8 and 9, this direct effect becomes insignificant. Thus, prior experience in 
emerging markets matters only if the institutional distance between home and host contexts is 
high.   25
These results support our conjecture that distance in all three dimensions is important 
to explain the entry mode choice. Moreover, their interaction with firm characteristics is also 
important and the interpretation is complex. Failure to account for the interaction can lead to 
misjudgments on the impact of other variables on entry mode choice. 
  
DISCUSSION 
The concept of institutional distance helps to explain how differences between countries affect 
international business decisions. We have argued that this concept is broader than the measures 
of cultural distance used in prior research; and that cognitive and regulatory aspects of distance 
may have quite different effects on international business strategies. Our results confirm the 
opposite effects of different aspects of distance on entry mode choice, and the interaction of 
distance with firm and project specific variables.  
More specifically, we show that while an increase in the regulatory distance results in a 
higher propensity to set up a greenfield investment, the opposite is true for high differences in 
cognitive aspects. Achieving internal consistency is impeded in highly distant normative, 
regulatory or cognitive institutional contexts. By setting up greenfield investments, MNEs can 
ease the transfer of strategic organizational practices. Meanwhile, legitimacy of the foreign 
operations is more difficult to attain when the normative and cognitive distances are high, but 
this may be overcome by entering with a local partner. The relative importance of external 
legitimacy and internal consistency often depends on contextual variables 
Moreover, we hypothesized that the probability of a greenfield investment is positively 
related to regulatory distance, but negatively related to normative and cognitive distance. Our 
empirical analysis confirms that regulatory and cognitive distance have opposite effects but the 
impact of normative distance is insignificant unless interaction effects are taken into account.  
We find that the relative size of the foreign affiliate and the MNE’s’ level of international 
experience act to moderate the impact of institutional distance. As larger affiliates command 
more attention from their foreign parent, MNEs that aim to establish large foreign operations are 
more inclined to avoid the managerial challenges of intercultural JVs or acquisitions by setting 
up greenfield investments. Cross-cultural communication problems arise in particular with 
normative distance, which thus deters JV or acquisition entry if the project is large. With respect 
to international experience, theoretical considerations suggest that experience and low distance   26
both increase the familiarity of the foreign investor with the local context. In distant countries, 
experience can compensate for the obstacles of distance and facilitate the otherwise difficult 
transfer of practices and attaining legitimacy. We found that an MNE’s’ level of international 
experience does indeed moderate the impact of regulatory and normative institutional distance 
on entry mode choice. Moreover, we find that experience influences mode choice only if 
institutional distance is high.  
Our analysis supports the view that business strategies have some distinctive 
characteristics in emerging markets (Wright et al., 2005). For example, the process of expansion 
into foreign markets normally follows the pattern of starting with a low capital commitment, 
which can later be increased once the MNE has gained sufficient international experience. The 
traditional internationalization process thus describes a gradual increase of involvement through 
changing level of commitments from contractual arrangement to joint ventures, and finally to 
wholly-owned affiliates (Johansen and Vahlne, 1977). However, in an emerging market, the 
financial and managerial challenges of engaging in a joint venture may be considerable, given 
the organizational legacy from the venture partner and the often weak technology. Thus, we find 
MNE’s may prefer to build a small local operation first, and on the basis of this local operation 
search for a suitable local partner for a larger project. Therefore, while in developed markets 
international experience has a positive effect on the propensity to set up a greenfield investment, 
our results show the opposite effect for emerging economies.   
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this paper, we propose new indicators of the institutional environment that taken together 
provide a richer proxy for institutional distance than has been employed in the literature hitherto. 
We have argued that this approach has particular relevance for emerging markets, where the 
concept of institutional distance is particularly complex and multi-faceted, and a less coarse set 
of measures may greatly improve our understanding of business strategies in these 
environments. We have also sought to ensure that the indices that we propose are easily 
computable and are based on publicly accessible data because the availability of suitable data is 
a major constraint on research about emerging markets.    
Our approach has some weaknesses however. Our measures may not capture certain 
aspects of normative and cognitive distance, e.g. the entrepreneurship orientation of individuals,   27
managerial abilities, or the appreciation of work quality. Moreover, our use of culture as a proxy 
of the normative dimension of distance is open to criticism because culture is a carrier, not a 
component, of the institutional environment (Scott, 2001/1995). Further research may wish to 
develop an alternative construct for the normative environment. 
  A more general concern is the assumption of corporate and spatial homogeneity in the 
use of indices such as ours (Shenkar 2001). The use of indices reflecting the host or home 
economy, or the distance between them, assumes that the average of the respective country is an 
appropriate measure of the environment of the specific FDI project. However host economies 
may vary internally, while MNE’s are exposed to different environments and develop their own 
unique corporate culture. Hence, unsurprisingly, we find that distance affects primarily firms 
with little international experience. Thus, indices of the environment must always be 
approximations rather than precise measures.  
  Our analysis of entry mode choice also has limitations. Chang and Rosenzweig (2001) 
have shown that the entry mode choice for first and subsequent entries into a foreign country 
might be influenced by different factors. We control for this effect with our experience variable. 
However, further research may clarify how the impact of institutional distance on entry mode 
choice and its interaction with MNE and project characteristics varies for subsequent entries. 
Given the multidimensionality of institutions, such research could show which institutional 
aspects are more challenging to overcome for foreign investors. 
In our empirical analysis we have studied the relation between entry mode choice and the 
institutional distance using a dataset that consists from FDI in manufacturing industry. However, 
scholars have shown that because of their peculiarities (e.g. low capital intensity), service firms’ 
might choose their entry modes based on different criteria than manufacturing firms (Brouthers 
and Brouthers, 2003). In further research scholars might want to investigate the relevance of the 
institutional distance for the entry mode choice in services.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Previous research has shown that similarities between the home and host countries may 
influence entry mode choice, using the concept of psychic distance, mostly measured by 
Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions of culture. In this study, we show that, in addition to normative 
aspects of culture, cognitive and regulatory dimensions indicate distance between countries that   28
are highly relevant for international business strategies. Different institutional aspects impact the 
entry mode decision in different ways and therefore, in order to capture the range of pressures 
that distance exerts on MNE’s, researchers should consider all these aspects together. In 
addition, institutional distance may interact with firm and project characteristics in determining 
the entry strategy.  
Our empirical study of entry mode in four very different emerging markets confirms that 
different aspects of institutional distance impact on the mode of entry in different and often 
contradictory ways. Moreover, the interactions with firm and project specific characteristics are 
significant and complex. The estimated equations reveal that firm and project specific 
characteristics influence the choice of entry mode differently depending on whether institutional 
distance is large or small. This suggests that particular characteristics may have a different 
influence on choices for investments between developed countries, and between developed and 
developing countries. For example, between developed market economies where institutional 
distance is small, international experience has a positive effect on the propensity to enter through 
a greenfield investment. However, between developed economies and emerging markets, where 
institutional distance is large, the opposite effect holds; international experience increases the 
probability of entry through Joint venture or acquisition. The fact that scholars have ignored 
these interactions might explain the conflicting results obtained in previous research regarding 
the impact of country differences on the entry decision (Shenkar, 2001). 
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Figure 1: Managing across Institutional Distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interaction Effects 
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Table 1: Source countries of FDI accounting for 90% of inward FDI stock. 
Country  Main foreign investors 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
United States (34.44%), France (16.65%), Netherlands (14.14%), Germany (8.89%), Japan 
(3.59%), Australia (3.36%), Canada (3.17%), Switzerland (3.09%), Belgium / Luxembourg 
(1.38%), and Sweden (1.34%). TOTAL 90.05%. 
CANADA  United States (62.38%), France (9.37%), United Kingdom (7.54%), Netherlands (5.02%), Japan 
(2.64%), Germany (2.35%), and Switzerland (1.91%). TOTAL 91.21%. 
VIETNAM  Singapore (15.05%), Taiwan (12.49%), Hong Kong (9.29%), Japan (8.80%), South Korea 
(8.25%), France (5.56%), British Virgin Islands (4.72%), United Kingdom (4.54%), Russia 
(4.03%), United States (3.43%), Australia (2.99%), Malaysia (2.89%), Thailand (2.79%), Panama 
(1.72%), Switzerland (1.60%), Netherlands (1.50%), and India (1.39%). TOTAL 91.06%. 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
United Kingdom (77.85%), Germany (5.37%), United States (5.37%), and Switzerland (2.68%). 
TOTAL 91.28%. 
INDIA  United States (25.41%), Mauritius (15.15%), United Kingdom (10.23%), Japan (5.05%), 
Korea(South) (4.34%), Germany (4.08%), Netherlands (3.96%), Australia (2.98%), France 
(2.89%), Malaysia (2.68%), Singapore (2.36%), Italy (2.11%), Belgium (2.01%), Israel (1.87%), 
Cayman Island (1.71%), Switzerland (1.38%), Canada (1.27%), and Thailand (1.09%). TOTAL 
90.55%. 
EGYPT  United States (54.36%), United Kingdom (33.21%), Germany (4.94%). TOTAL 92.51%. 
Sources: OECD database; The Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (2000); The Ministry of Industry, India; South 
African Reserve Bank; Central Bank of Egypt. 
 
Table 2: Distance from main foreign investors that account for 90% of the FDI stock. 
   Normative  distance
  Regulatory distance  Cognitive distance  
Egypt  min  0.63 0.85 1.18 
  max  0.87 1.48 2.35 
  weighted avg  0.82 1.22 2.29 
India  min  0.38 1.18 0.21 
  max  0.85 3.53 1.52 
  weighted avg  0.62 1.86 0.96 
South Africa  min  0.22 0 0.68 
  max  0.35 1.18 1.32 
  weighted avg  0.34 0.10 0.72 
Vietnam  min  0.26 1.18 0.09 
  max  1.11 4.70 1.58 
  weighted avg  0.60 3.40 0.97 
UK  min  0.15 0 0.05 
  max  0.93 1.18 0.70 
  weighted avg  0.45 0.64 0.40 
Canada  min  0.20 0 0.31 
  max  0.90 1.18 0.78 
  weighted avg  0.28 0.24 0.41 
Definitions and Sources: See Appendix 1. 
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Table 3: Entry Mode Choice – Institutions 
Logistic Regression Results (Greenfield = 1) 
Base Model  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Variables 
B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald B Wald
Regulatory_d     0.765
** 6.49         0.809
** 6.57
Normative_d         0.140  0.52     0.350  2.41
Cognitive_d             -0.406
*** 8.91 -0.519
*** 11.27
Relative size  -0.131  1.4  -0.126  1.23 -0.122  1.19 -0.183  2.56  -0.170  2.02
Experience -2.355
*** 11.91 -2.547
*** 13.2 -2.404
*** 12.2 -2.465
*** 11.91 -2.891
*** 13.94
Market seeking  -0.010
** 4.33 -0.010
* 3.75 -0.011
** 4.57 -0.011
** 4.75 -0.012
** 5.23
Source of main resource  0.010
** 5.28 0.010
** 4.88 0.010
** 5.39 0.010
** 4.54 0.010
** 4.84
R&D intensity  0.173
* 2.87 0.197
* 3.6  0.165 2.58 0.240
** 4.8 0.271
** 5.73
Related  0.477 0.71 0.531 0.84 0.443  0.6  0.347 0.36 0.302 0.24
Diversification -1.282
** 4.86 -1.616
*** 6.96 -1.308
** 4.98 -1.568
*** 6.82 -2.083
*** 10.07
Constant 2.405  2.48 1.208  0.54 2.199  1.93 4.178
** 6.36 3.059
* 2.87
N  208  208  208  208  208  
Chi-square  (df)  77.56(14)  84.44(15)  78.08(15)  87.37(15)  97.52(17)  
Pseudo R
2 0.280    0.304    0.281    0.314    0.351   
Increase in Chi-square 
(df), relative to 
benchmark model 
--   6.88 (1)*** 
over base 
0.52 (1) 
over base 
9.81 (1)*** 
over base 
10.15 (2)*** 
over model 3 
Notes:
 * =10%, 
** =5%, 
*** =1%. 
All regression included country dummies and time trends for each country. The initial regression also 
included industry dummies, but since none of them was significant and since our sample is small we 
decided to drop them. 
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Table 4: Entry Mode Choice – Institutions and Interaction Effects 
Logistic Regression Results (Greenfield = 1) 
Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Variables 
B Wald B Wald B Wald B  Wald  B Wald
Regulatory_d 2.831
** 4.55         1.388  1.24  0.882
*** 7.08 
Regulatory_d*relative size  0.024  0.04         -0.012  0.01     
Regulatory_d*experience -2.311
* 3.5          -0.560  0.26     
Normative_d     0.480  0.41     1.211  0.88  0.693  0.81 
Normative_d*relative size      0.259
** 4.92     0.230
* 2.88  0.255
** 4.32 
Normative_d*experience    -1.244
* 3.13     -1.721  2.05  -1.262
* 3.21 
Cognitive_d         -0.720  2.4  -1.164  1.49  -0.515
*** 10.06
Cognitive_d*relative size          0.038  0.33  0.012  0.02     
Cognitive_d*experience      0.229  0.3  0.657  0.53    
Relative size  -0.157  0.48 -0.732
** 6.08 -0.317  1.44  -0.721
* 3.42  -0.765
** 5.96 
Experience -0.261  0.03 -0.332  0.06 -3.287
* 3.79 -1.388  0.34  -0.776 0.27 
Market seeking  -0.010
* 3.68 -0.009
* 3.24 -0.011
** 4.18 -0.010
* 3.64 -0.010
* 3.64 
Source of main resource  0.011
** 5.65 0.011
** 5.8 0.010
** 4.83 0.012
** 5.75 0.011
** 5.36 
R&D intensity  0.206
* 3.75 0.149  1.99 0.242
** 4.82 0.262
** 4.97 0.254
** 4.72 
Related 0.359  0.37 0.320  0.3  0.350  0.36  0.125  0.04  0.141  0.05 
Diversification -1.715
*** 7.12 -1.592
** 6.15 -1.552
*** 6.64 -2.440
*** 10.22 -2.481
*** 11.3 
Constant -0.675  0.09 2.231  1.05 5.327
** 5.22  3.542  1.32  3.090 1.76 
N 208    208    208    208    208   
Chi-square (df)  89.82(17)    87.51(17)   87.94(17)    107.52(23)  106.26 (19) 
Pseudo R
2 0.323    0.315    0.316    0.387    0.382   
Increase in Chi-square (df), 
relative to benchmark 
model 
5.38 (2)* 
over model 1 
9.42 (2)*** 
over model 2 
0.57 (2) 
over model 3 
10.00 (6) 
over model 4 
8.74 (2)*** 
over model 4 
Notes:
 * =10%, 
** =5%, 
*** =1%. 
The regression included country dummies and time trends for each country. The initial regression also 
included industry dummies, but since none of them was significant and since our sample is small we 
decided to drop them.    33
Appendix 1: Variables – Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition  Source 
Regulatory_d  Absolute distance on the level of regulations and 
restrictions to operate a business 
Regulation Factor from 
the Index of Economic 
Freedom (2000) 
Normative_d  Distance on four cultural dimensions defined by 
Hofstede (1980): power distance, individualism, 
masculinity, uncertainty avoidance.
i 
Hofstede (2001) 
Cognitive_d  Distance on four cognitive dimensions:
 i 
1.  Percentage of economically active population that 
has attained at least tertiary education. Year: 2000; 
Age: 25+ 
 
ILO Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics 2001 and 2002, 
OECD Statistics, country 
Statistical Offices 
 
2.  Average schooling years in the total population. 
Year: 2000; Age: 25+ 
Barro and Lee (2000) 
 
 
3.  Number of computers per 1000 persons  World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2000 
 4.  Number of internet hosts per 1000 persons  WDI (2000) 
Relative size 
affiliate / parent 
Takes into account the relative turnover in the affiliate 
and in the parent company for the year 2001 and was 
assessed based on a Likert-type scale from one (0.0-
0.1%) to six (over 20%). 
FDI Survey 
Experience  Prior experience in emerging markets. Dummy: = 1 if 
the investor had prior commercial experience in the 
host country, its region or other emerging markets; = 
0 otherwise 
FDI Survey 
Market seeking  Percentage of output sold in the domestic market 
during the first year of business operation. 
FDI Survey 
Source of main 
resource 
Percentage of the main resource that was obtained 
from the foreign parent firm during the first two years 
of operation (We asked respondents to select the most 
important type of resources for their affiliate’s 
competitiveness. In a second question we then asked 
to estimate what percentage of this resource would be 
contributed by respectively the foreign partner, the 
local partner, or other sources.) 
FDI Survey 
R&D intensity  Worldwide expenditure of the foreign parent firm on 
R&D as a percentage of its global sales 
FDI Survey 
Related Diversification  parent/affiliate. Dummy = 1 if one of 
affiliate’s products is also produced by its foreign 
parent; = 0 otherwise. 
FDI Survey 
Diversification  Parent’s degree of diversification. Dummy = 1 if the 
parent is a conglomerate diversified into unrelated 
business sectors; = 0 otherwise. 
FDI Survey 
Time trends for 
each country 
Year of legal establishment in a specific country – 
1989 (= 0 if the host country is one of the remaining 
three countries) 
FDI Survey 
Country dummies  Four country dummies  FDI survey   34
i Distance is computed as  ∑
−
=
i
V
I I
i
origin i host i D
2
, , ) (
, where Ii,host (Ii,origin) is the ith dimension of the 
standardized index for the host country (country of origin). We used standardized values for each 
dimension since scales are not the same across dimensions. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 Variable  Mean SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 Greenfield  ***  ***  1  
2 Normative_d  2.38  0.99  0.09 1  
3 Normative_d*Relative  size  7.21  5.06  0.18 0.47 1  
4 Normative_d*Experience  2.20  1.16 -0.06 0.82 0.33 1  
5 Regulatory_d  1.62  0.96  0.34 0.27 0.28 0.20 1  
6 Regulatory_d*Relative  size  5.36  5.18  0.31 0.05 0.64 -0.02 0.72 1  
7 Regulatory_d*Experience  1.47  1.02  0.16 0.28 0.21 0.47 0.84 0.54 1 
8 Cognitive_d  3.88  1.58 -0.07 0.35 0.12 0.30 0.19 0.08 0.21  1
9 Cognitive_d*Relative  size  12.04  8.62  0.08 0.04 0.69 -0.02 0.24 0.66 0.16  0.48 1
10 Cognitive_d*Experience  3.56  1.88  -0.17 0.33 0.06 0.58 0.16 0.00 0.42 0.80 0.29 1
11 Experience  0.91  0.29  -0.23 0.13 -0.06 0.60 0.00 -0.11 0.46 0.07 -0.11 0.60 1
12 Market  seeking  70.99  41.17  -0.28 -0.03 -0.28 -0.02 -0.37 -0.45 -0.29  -0.16 -0.36 -0.11 0.02 1
13 Source  of  main  resource  59.07  42.75  0.24 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.22 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.08 1
14 Relative  size  3.16  1.84  0.11 -0.17 0.72 -0.22 0.14 0.70 0.04  -0.08 0.77 -0.17 -0.19 -0.27 0.00 1
15 Related  0.86  0.35  0.16 0.12 0.17 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.02 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.08 -0.05 0.04 0.11 1
16 R&D  intensity  3.48  2.01  0.08 0.04 0.05 0.12 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.17 0.02 0.16 0.00 0.01 1
17 Diversification  0.15  0.36  -0.20 -0.05 -0.15 -0.05 0.09 -0.07 0.11  -0.16 -0.21 -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.15 -0.17 -0.05  36
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